Search results for "jel:L1"
showing 10 items of 37 documents
Factors explaining the interest margin in the banking sectors of the European Union
2003
Abstract This study analyses the interest margin in the principal European banking sectors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) in the period 1993–2000 using a panel of 15,888 observations, identifying the fundamental elements affecting this margin. Our starting point is the methodology developed in the original study by Ho and Saunders [Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis XVI (1981) 581–600] and later extensions, but widened to take banks' operating costs explicitly into account. Also, unlike the usual practice in the literature, a direct measure of the degree of competition (Lerner index) in the different markets is used. The results show that the fall of marg…
Les effets macroéconomiques sur la productivité et les prix de vastes réformes structurelles sur les marchés des biens et du travail
2015
La présente analyse vise à caractériser les effets « directs » et « indirects » des régulations sur le marché des biens ainsi que les effets des régulations sur le marché du travail, sur la productivité et sur les prix. L’analyse est empirique et réalisée via des estimations sur un panel de quatorze pays sur la période 1987-2007, et quand cela est possible sur des donnés sectorielles (treize secteurs manufacturiers et cinq secteurs des services et réseaux). Au terme de ces estimations, il est possible de caractériser les effets de la mise en oeuvre de réformes structurelles. Les réformes structurelles consistent ici en une baisse des indicateurs de régulations sur les marchés des biens et d…
Networks of knowledge among unionized firms
2008
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) an…
R&D, Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation Revisited
2012
In this paper, we have presented a generalization of Bucci's (2003) model in which have disentangled the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization in order to have a better measurement of competition. Indeed, unlike Bucci (2003), in our model, the measure of competition is completely independent of the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization. Our main finding is that, unlike Bucci (2003), we show that the competition does not play any role in growth. This result is explained by the complementarity of innovation and human capital assumed in the research produ…
Mesure de la performance des agences bancaires par une approche DEA
2005
Using a DEA framework (Data Envelopment Analysis), we develop new performance indicators for integrated retail networks. A methodological discussion leads us to propose a productivity indicator which respects the criteria of controllability and transversal coherence. We then formalise the relationship between a performance indicator of a network's headquarters and the productivity of its various retailers. Finally, we combine these new indicators in crafting a management tool amenable to a system of balanced scorecards.
Endogenous firm asymmetry and cooperative R&D in linear duopoly with spillovers
2005
In a linear model ofcost reducing R&D/Cournot competition, firm asymmetry is shown to be sustainable as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with R&D competition only ifthe productivity of research is sufficiently large relative to the benefits from imitation. In such a case, industry-wide cost reduction and firms asymmetry are increasing and decreasing functions of the spillover rate, respectively. In the absence of spillovers, a symmetric joint lab generates higher consumer surplus and social welfare than a pair ofasymmetric competitors. If spillovers are not too small, asymmetric R&D competition is advantageous toconsumers, but not to firms.
The Stackelberg equilibrium as a consistent conjectural equilibrium
2011
International audience; We consider a static game with conjectural variations where some firms make conjectures while others do not. Two propositions are proved. We first show that there exists a continuum of conjectural variations such that the conjectural equilibrium locally coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium (Proposition 1). Second, we define the conditions under which a conjectural equilibrium is a locally consistent equilibrium (i.e. such that conjectures are fulfilled). The conceptof (local) consistency is restricted to firms making conjectures. Two conditions on consistency are featured: consistency within a cohort and consistency among cohorts. The Stackelberg equilibrium fu…
The Classical Notion of Competition Revisited
2013
This article seeks to fill a lacuna within classical economics concerning the process of market price determination in situations of market disequilibrium. To this aim, first we distinguish the classical notion of free competition from the Walrasian notion of perfect competition and we argue that the latter is beset with some theoretical difficulties alien to the former. Second, we reconstruct in some detail Smith’s and Marx’s views concerning market price determination and show that Marx’s extensive use of metaphors and numerical examples foreshadows the modern taxonomy of buyers’ market, sellers’ market, and mixed strategy equilibrium in the capacity space of a standard Bertrand duopoly m…
Regional financial development and bank competition: effects on firms' growth
2009
Fernandez de Guevara J. and Maudos J. Regional financial development and bank competition: effects on firms' growth, Regional Studies. This paper analyses the effect of regional financial development and bank competition on firms' growth using the Spanish provinces as a testing ground. The results show that firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grow faster in more financially developed provinces. The results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-‘U’ effect on firms' growth, suggesting that market power has its highest effect at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to the financial dependence of the industry to which …
Monitoring and Market Power in Loan Markets
2000
Whether or not banks are engaged in ex ante monitoring of customers may have important consequences for the whole economy. We approach this question via a model in which banks can invest in either information acquisition or market power (product differentiation). The two alternatives generate different predictions, which are tested using panel data on Finnish local banks. We find evidence that banks’ investments in branch networks and human capital (personnel) contribute to information acquisition but not to market power. We also find that managing customers’ money transactions enhances banks ability to control their lending risks.