Search results for "mathematical economics"
showing 10 items of 240 documents
Mark Baker (2015),Case: Its principles and parameters
2018
The usefulness of a mathematical model of exposure for environmental risk assessment
2011
We respond to the Comment of Lang et al . [[1][1]] regarding our mathematical model [[2][2]] of exposure of non-target Lepidoptera to Bt -maize pollen expressing Cry1Ab within Europe. Lang et al . remark on the degree to which the model was subject to uncertainty. Perry et al . [[2][2]] did indeed
Initial Enlargement in a Markov chain market model
2011
Enlargement of filtrations is a classical topic in the general theory of stochastic processes. This theory has been applied to stochastic finance in order to analyze models with insider information. In this paper we study initial enlargement in a Markov chain market model, introduced by Norberg. In the enlarged filtration, several things can happen: some of the jumps times can be accessible or predictable, but in the original filtration all the jumps times are totally inaccessible. But even if the jumps times change to accessible or predictable, the insider does not necessarily have arbitrage possibilities.
Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games
2014
We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set.
Specialization of cycles and the K-theory elevator
2017
A general specialization map is constructed for higher Chow groups and used to prove a "going-up" theorem for algebraic cycles and their regulators. The results are applied to study the degeneration of the modified diagonal cycle of Gross and Schoen, and of the coordinate symbol on a genus-2 curve.
Rejoinder on: Natural Induction: An Objective Bayesian Approach
2009
Giron and Moreno. We certainly agree with Professors Giron and Moreno on the interest in sensitivity of any Bayesian result to changes in the prior. That said, we also consider of considerable pragmatic importance to be able to single out a unique, particular prior which may reasonably be proposed as the reference prior for the problem under study, in the sense that the corresponding posterior of the quantity of interest could be routinely used in practice when no useful prior information is available or acceptable. This is precisely what we have tried to do for the twin problems of the rule of succession and the law of natural induction. The discussants consider the limiting binomial versi…
Attractors/Basin of Attraction
2020
It is a controversial issue to decide who first coined the term “attractor”. According to Peter Tsatsanis, the editor of the English version of Prédire n’est pas expliquer, it was René Thom who first introduced such a term. It is necessary, however, to remember that Thom thought that it was first introduced by the American mathe- matician Steven Smale, “although Smale says it was Thom that coined the neolo- gism “attractor”“(Tsatsanis 2010: 63–64 n. 20). From this point of view, Bob Williams expressed a more cautious opinion by saying that “the word “attractor” was invented by these guys, Thom and Smale” (Cucker and Wong 2000: 183). But other mathematicians are of the opinion that the term …
Probabilities of conditionals and previsions of iterated conditionals
2019
Abstract We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then C as information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated conditionals, which allow…
M.J. (Susie) Bayarri
2021
Robust Allocation Rules in Dynamical Cooperative TU Games
2011
Robust dynamic coalitional TU games are repeated TU games where the values of the coalitions are unknown but bounded variables. We set up the game supposing that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we provide a constructive method for designing allocation rules that converge to the core of the average game. Both the set up and the solution approach also provide an insight on commonalities between coalitional games and stability theory.