Search results for "microeconomics"

The validity of collective climates

1999

The objective of this study is to test the validity of the collective climate concept. It was expected that membership in collective climates was related to membership in the collectivities defined by departmental membership, hierarchical level, shift, job location and organizational tenure. The study sample was composed of 195 employees from a central administration agency. Using a combination of hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering methods, three different collective climates were obtained. The results showed that only hierarchical level was related to collective climate membership. Based on all the results obtained, the debate on the validity of collective climates is reconsidere…

A typological approach of perceived resource fluctuations after job transitions in a representative panel study

2020

Job and career transitions are unique experiences that vary within and between persons. One possible reason for the differential effects of transitions is that they can involve resource gains, loss...

Preferencias adaptativas: un obstáculo pendiente para la renta básica

2019

Resumen La renta básica proporciona a la ciudadanía una autonomía económica que se traduce en una libertad real para conducir sus vidas. Sin embargo, en este artículo defiendo que la renta básica no sería efectiva en situaciones de pobreza donde se generan preferencias adaptativas en las personas. Para mostrarlo analizaré las bases psicológicas del comportamiento de personas con preferencias adaptativas. A continuación, abordaré qué estrategias son las indicadas para revertir la situación de preferencias adaptativas. Implementar estas políticas permitirá que la renta básica pueda empoderar también a los más pobres.

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

2005

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. For this second stage we have studied both the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-lo…

Rent Seeking in Public Procurement

2005

The microeconomic maximisation of a ratio of profit : a restatement

1993

On the traditional microeconomic theory, firms are supposed to maximise theaggregate pure profit. We study other objective functions which are ratios profit over capital. We explore various combinations, proposing a typology of the ratios o f profit, particularly the rate of profit (accounting profit over capital), the rate o f gross profit (gross profit over capital), the rate of accounting profit (accounting profit over capital). The cases of monopoly with variable coefficient of capital, monopoly with fix coefficient of capital, competition with fix coefficient of capital, are studied. The solutions given by the maximisation of the aggregate pure profit and the maximisation of the rate o…

A Problem of Optimization in a Case of Foreign Investment

2000

The aim of the paper is to solve an optimization problem in an economic system with a central bank and a set of private agents. Each agent aims to maximize her expected utility, with rational expectations and being risk averse. The agents follow a profitability-risk criterium to face the portfolio diversification problem between foreign or domestic investment. An explicit formula for the optimal amount of foreign investment as a function of the expected exchange rate and an explicit formula for the exchange rate are obtained. These formulas show the hard influence of the expected exchange rate, the variance and the risk aversion on the agents’ decisions.

Multistage Dynamics of International Environmental Agreements: Free-riding from Membership and Compliance*

2009

Abstract In dealing with the multistage dynamics of international environmental agreements (IEAs), it is necessary to analyze the dynamics of global emission level associated with the corresponding abatement process. We model multilateral collaboration among countries as a two-level coalitional game of heterogeneous players with a stepwise emission reduction over a finite and discretized period of time. The formed coalition is assumed to hold a leader's position in the game, and the players that did not join the agreement (free-riders) are assumed to accept a position of the followers. To analyze fulfillment of the emission reduction targets, we construct a time-consistent abatement scheme,…

A Binary Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm for a Double Auction Market

2007

In this paper, we shall show the design of a multi-unit double auction (MDA) market. It should be enough robust, flexible and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. In a MDA market, sellers and buyers submit respectively asks and bids. A trade is made if a buyers bid exceeds a sellers ask. A sellers ask may match several buyers bids and a buyers bid may satisfy several sellers asks. The trading rule of a market defines the organization, information exchange process, trading procedure and clearance rules of the market. The mechanism is announced before the opening of the market so that every agent knows how the market will operate in advance. These autonomous agents pursue their o…

Impact of Risk Aversion on Bidder's Optimal Strategy in Takeover Contests

2008

We consider a takeover setting in which bidders are risk averse and study aversion's consequences on their strategy. We found that when bidders are risk averse, under some conditions, their overbidding depends on the size of toeholds they hold. We show that there is a threshold under that a bidder doesn't overbid into the takeover process and becomes aggressive above that treshold. However, if the overbidding increases in toeholds size, it decreases in valuation. Without toeholds, takeovers's results are similar if bidders are averse or neutral risk.