Search results for "microeconomics"
showing 10 items of 442 documents
Structural contagion and vulnerability to unexpected liquidity shortfalls
2012
This paper assumes that financial fluctuations are the result of the dynamic interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions of individual economic units. The framework is an extention of Sordi and Vercelli (2012) designed as an heterogeneous agent model which proceeds through discrete time steps within a finite time horizon. The interaction at the micro-level between economic units monitors the spread of contagion and systemic risk, producing interesting complex dynamics. The model is analysed by means of numerical simulations and systemic risk modelling, where local interaction of units is captured and analysed by the bilateral provision of liquidity among units. The behaviour and e…
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers
2005
A duopoly model of cost reducing R&D-Cournot market competition is extended to encompass endogenous timing of R&D investments. Under the assumption that R&D spillovers are zero under simultaneous choices of R&D and only flow from the R&D leader to the follower under sequential choices, sequential and simultaneous play at the R&D stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry. The only timing structure of the R&D stage sustainable as subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and thus zero spillovers.
Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences
2004
This paper focuses on the formation, evolution and stability of the distribution of preferences in the population and its relationship with the investment and bargaining strategies in a simplified hold up problem. More precisely, in our model a population of infinitely-lived players (say, for example, firms) with homogeneous selfish or self-regarding preferences is pair-wise matched at each period with a population of an equal size of short-lived players (say, for example, workers) with heterogeneous preferences. Both types of player play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide separately but simultaneously whether to make a general or a relation-specific investment. The latter ty…
Time and strategy: towards a multitemporal view of the firm
2004
This paper takes into consideration the main views underlying the theory of the resource based firm within strategy studies, underscoring their fundamental monotemporal nature and proposing a way to elaborate a multi‐temporal view of the firm. By analyzing the link between the time concepts used as bases for the formulation of studies within the strategy field and the types of actor behavior implicitly (or explicitly) entailed by such time concepts, the paper shows the inadequacy of any one of the two monotemporal views of the resource‐based firm to encompass all of the main actor behaviors on which the firm's survival and success increasingly rests. The paper draws on the Austrian process …
Quantifying sunk costs and learning effects in R&D persistence
2020
Abstract This paper analyzes and quantifies the fundamental factors that are likely to cause persistence in performing R&D activities: the existence of sunk costs associated with R&D activities and the process of learning that characterizes this type of activity. We estimate our model with Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1991-2014. By decomposing the effects of sunk costs and learning effects, we find that both are important determinants of R&D persistence, and that failing to allow for learning systematically overestimates sunk cost effects. Both large firms and SMEs benefit from direct and indirect (via productivity) effects of R&D experience, but in large firms this is more li…
Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?
2021
Abstract Centralized sanctioning in social dilemmas has been shown to increase efficiency with respect to standard decentralized peer punishment. In this context, we explore the impact of sanctioners’ motivations through their payoff scheme, not only on their actions but also on the actions of the monitored individuals. To do so, we compare the implementation of two different payoff schemes for the monitor in a centralized sanctioning framework: (i) a fixed payoff scheme and (ii) a variable payoff scheme contingent on the level of cooperation achieved. We find that providing the sanctioner with a contingent payoff has a negative impact on contributions. This occurs although sanctioners impl…
Mean-Field Game Modeling the Bandwagon Effect with Activation Costs
2015
This paper provides a mean-field game theoretic model of the bandwagon effect in social networks. This effect can be observed whenever individuals tend to align their own opinions to a mainstream opinion. The contribution is threefold. First, we describe the opinion propagation as a mean-field game with local interactions. Second, we establish mean-field equilibrium strategies in the case where the mainstream opinion is constant. Such strategies are shown to have a threshold structure. Third, we extend the use of threshold strategies to the case of time-varying mainstream opinion and study the evolution of the macroscopic system.
Modéliser la suburbanisation
2002
L’histoire de la suburbanisation de la population et de l’emploi, principalement aux Etats-Unis, permet d’identifier trois caracteristiques du phenomene. 1/ La suburbanisation se traduit par un etalement urbain tel que population et emploi s’accroissent plus en peripherie qu’au centre. 2/ La suburbanisation fait emerger de nouvelles concentrations d’activites dans la peripherie des villes-centres et donne naissance a des structures urbaines multicentriques. 3/ La suburbanisation differencie les contenus et les fonctions economiques des centres et recompose les centralites urbaines. Dans ce cadre, la suburbanisation se presente selon des modalites differentes selon les epoques et les regions…
A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control
2002
Abstract In this note, we evaluate the scope of Dockner and Long’s [Journal of Environment Economics and Management 24 (1993) 13] conclusion on the efficiency of the non-cooperative outcome in a differential game of international pollution control. We also complete the study of the different equilibria the differential game can present. Our results show that their conclusion requires that the initial value of the stock of pollution be higher than the Pareto-efficient pollution stock so that the equilibrium path of emissions involves a decreasing stock of pollution. Our results also show that the application of the procedure proposed by Tsutsui and Mino [Journal of Economic Theory 52 (1990) …
Converging Analysis of the Concept of Strategic Group in the Spanish Lighting Industry
2008
Strategic group literature does not seem to offer strong enough theoretical bases to state the very existence of strategic groups and their effects on firm’s conduct and performance. The empirical validation of the existence of strategic groups has been usually done trying to contrast their predictive validity in relation to performance, obtaining conflicting evidence. Other papers have decided to contrast the convergent validity of the strategic group concept using different definitions and measures of this construct. Our work belongs to the second type of studies. It tries to make progress in the development of a theoretical model, able to state the industry features which affect the prob…