6533b861fe1ef96bd12c59c6
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers
Antonio Tesorieresubject
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource ManagementEconomics and EconometricsStackelberg equilibriumEndogenous timingmedia_common.quotation_subjectjel:D43Settore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataAsymmetryCompetition (economics)Microeconomicssymbols.namesakeStrategic investmentR&D with spillovers Firm AsymmetryStackelberg competitionEconomicsDuopolymedia_commonjel:C72Endogenous symmetryendogenous symmetry endogenous timing Stackelberg equilibriumjel:L11Nash equilibriumjel:L13symbolsendogenous timing stackelberg equilibriumSymmetry (geometry)Mathematical economicsdescription
A duopoly model of cost reducing R&D-Cournot market competition is extended to encompass endogenous timing of R&D investments. Under the assumption that R&D spillovers are zero under simultaneous choices of R&D and only flow from the R&D leader to the follower under sequential choices, sequential and simultaneous play at the R&D stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry. The only timing structure of the R&D stage sustainable as subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and thus zero spillovers.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |