0000000000138553
AUTHOR
Edgar Maraguat
Acting under the idea of freedom: Kant and the Incorporation Thesis
Este artículo examina un supuesto fundamental de la filosofía moral kantiana, a saber: que sin libertad trascendental, entendida como la propiedad de la voluntad por la que se determina a actuar sin ser afectada por resortes sensibles, no se le pueden imputar al presunto agente actos inmorales. Teóricamente se argumenta contra el sentido lógico del supuesto (se revela la consecuencia aporética de la concepción) y se muestra cuán superfluo es en la práctica. De todos modos, se le reconoce a Kant, contra una línea de argumentación nietzscheana bien conocida, el mérito de haber captado el compromiso humano insuperable con la idea de que somos seres discrecionales o libres trascendentalmente. Y…
Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.
La verdad de la Naturaleza
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Hegel on the Productivity of Action: Metaphysical Questions, Non-Metaphysical Answers, and Metaphysical Answers
AbstractCharles Taylor claims that not only Kant, but also successors of Kant such as Fichte and Hegel, advocate a primitive concept of action, namely, a basic, irreducible, indispensable concept allegedly essential to our self-understanding. This paper shows how philosophers like Robert Brandom agree with Taylor explicitly with regard to Hegel, and attribute to him transcendental non-metaphysical arguments in support of such a concept. It then proceeds to challenge this attribution (both of the concept and the type of argument), offering a brief presentation of an alternative non-transcendental metaphysical approach to the Hegelian idea of giving actuality to a concept (or end) through a p…
Mecanismo y teleología en la Lógica de Hegel
<p class='p1'>¿Cómo hay que entender la tesis de Hegel en la Lógica de que “la teleología es la verdad del mecanismo”? La afirmó contra Kant, desde luego; a saber, contra la posibilidad de que lo que parece teleológico sea sólo mecánico; pero no en el sentido de un compromiso dogmático con la realidad de fines naturales y tampoco en el de una refutación del mecanicismo como la que Fichte busca con su radicalización de la filosofía trascendental. Aquí se examina qué posibilidades quedan abiertas cuando se cierran aquéllas.</p>
El idealismo de Hegel y la refutación de Spinoza: algunos malentendidos recientes
Hegel’s Science of Logic contains a refutation ( Widerlegung ) of Spinoza’s system on whose correct understanding depends the adequate interpretation of the philosophical point of view of Hegel’s original brand of Idealism. I stress its importance, then indicate where to look for the rebuttal in the work and finally explain in what sense has a logical character (it is neither a phenomenological nor an epistemological nor a moral or practical argument). Also, some relatively recent approaches to many of the key passages are discussed in the paper, because they have fostered confusion about the way Hegel opposes Spinozism – which really is neither Kant’s nor Fichte’s way. http://dx.doi.org/10…