6533b829fe1ef96bd128afbd
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
Edgar Maraguatsubject
Fichteself-legislationteleologyMetaphysicsmechanismnaturalismlcsh:Speculative philosophy050601 international relationsSpiritcompatibilismScience of LogicIdea050602 political science & public administrationCompatibilismtranscendental philosophyintentional stancepostulateassumptionautonomylcsh:B1-5802action.NaturalismfaithPhilosophylcsh:Philosophy (General)05 social sciencesHegelianismGerman Idealismvoluntarism0506 political scienceEpistemologyKantPhilosophyIntentional stanceTeleologyGerman idealismlcsh:BD10-701objectivityTranscendental philosophydescription
the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016-01-01 | Revista de Filosofia |