0000000000170298
AUTHOR
Ismael Rodriguez-lara
showing 7 related works from this author
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all: Punishment and endowment heterogeneity in the trust game
2016
AbstractWe investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, re…
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all
2016
We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocit…
Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design
2013
We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the desig…
Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game
2012
This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.
Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.
2012
We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the effcient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the infl?uence cost is privately incurred by the agent. When manipulation activities negatively affect the agent?s productivity through the level of output, the design of infl?uence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive sch…
Standard vs random dictator games: On the effects of role uncertainty and framing on generosity
2021
This project was conducted while Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez was visiting Universidad Loyola Andalucia. He wants to particularly thank Pablo Brañas-Garza and Diego Jorrat for continued guidance and assessment with the experimental design. Álvaro Núñez-Bermúdez and the faculty members of the Economics and Business Sciences department at the University of Seville were very helpful in providing assistance for running the experiment. The paper has benefited from comments and suggestions provided by Maria Paz Espinosa, Giuseppe Attanassi, José Enrique Vila, Iván Arribas, Marco Faillo, Cristina Borra and participants at the Loyola Behavioral Lab and the Early Career Researchers in Experimental Economics…
SECCIÓN TEMÁTICA - 10. JUSTICIA REDISTRIBUTIVA EN EXPERIMENTOS DE LABORATORIO // REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
2012
Muchos problemas económicos están relacionados con la justicia redistributiva, por lo que estudiar el comportamiento en este área resulta fundamental. Para arrojar luz en el asunto, la economía experimental ha usado experimentos de laboratorio, en los que sujetos participantes deciden de forma anónima (y por medio de incentivos económicos) cómo dividir una determinada cuantía de dinero. Este artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura y ahonda en los diferentes enfoques usados hasta la fecha, poniendo especial atención al juego del dictador con producción, que ha emergido en los últimos años como la herramienta metodológica adecuada para estudiar el problema de la justicia redistributiv…