0000000000393817
AUTHOR
Barbara Elisabeth Müller
Cosmopolitanism as Nonrelationism and Relevant Duties of Justice
This chapter clarifies the new concept of cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism and embeds it in the academic debate. In defence of the new concept, it clarifies how personal relationships can be valued without treating them as a basis for justifying special responsibilities between related individuals. The argument distinguishes between different kinds of responsibilities based on a responsibility framework developed from conceptual considerations of Hart and O’Neill as well as Pettit and Goodin. It reveals that not all kinds of responsibilities are equally relevant with regard to matters of justice.
Analysis of the Standard Definition of Cosmopolitanism
This chapter investigates the traditional definition of cosmopolitanism which understands cosmopolitanism as moral egalitarianism. It sets out in detail how the three core elements (individualism, universality, and generality) allow so much room for interpretation that the definition hardly provides any information on what moral egalitarianism means. It confirms that cosmopolitanism as moral egalitarianism includes almost all theories of global justice, even such that are commonly seen as opposing positions.
Consequences and Conclusion
This chapter reflects the argument developed in the previous chapters, concluding that cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism is both a distinct and plausible position within the global justice debate. The chapter identifies prominent proponents and excludes others. The chapter also highlights the consequences of cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism for the evaluation and design of institutional structures on the global as well as on the domestic level.
Refuting the Relationist Challenge: Room for Partiality Rather Than Advocating Special Duties
Building on the responsibility framework developed in the previous chapter, this chapter completes the argument. It refutes the relationist challenge that personal relations require special responsibilities qualifying as relevant for matters of justice. The argument focuses Scheffler’s relationist arguments and demonstrates how his critique of nonrelationism can be resolved by differentiating between different types of responsibility.
Cosmopolitanism About Culture: Specifying Individualism
Still drawing on the classical distinction between moderate and extreme cosmopolitanism, this chapter analyses different specifications of the individualism element providing different answers to what it means to respect individuals as moral equals. The analysis eventually presents eight types of specification but rejects all of them as either still too broad or untenable. Only a hybrid type, which is composed of assumptions of different specification types, appears more promising. This defines the new concept of cosmopolitanism: cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism.