Mutual influences between Nitric Oxide and Paraoxonase 1

Este artículo se ha publicado de forma definitiva en: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3921/8/12/619 Este artículo pertenece al número especial "Paraoxonase in Oxidation and Inflammation". One of the best consolidated paradigms in vascular pharmacology is that an uncontrolled excess of oxidizing chemical species causes tissue damage and loss of function in the endothelial and subendothelial layers. The fact that high-density lipoproteins play an important role in preventing such an imbalance is integrated into that concept, for which the expression and activity of paraoxonases is certainly crucial. The term paraoxonase (aryldialkyl phosphatase, EC 3.1.8.1) encompasses at least three distinct isofo…

Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation

A travers l'analyse de l'article de D. Davidson intitule «Actions, reasons and causes» (1963), l'A. defend la these davidsonienne selon laquelle la rationalisation de l'explication des raisons est une sorte d'explication causale, mais soutient, contre Davidson, l'idee que la causalite doit etre comprise comme une dimension integrale de la justification elle-meme, et non pas comme une condition independante et additionnelle. Adoptant en partie les theories non-causales de l'explication de l'action, l'A. montre que la theorie de l'action et de l'esprit de Davidson est confrontee au probleme des chaines causales et au probleme de l'epiphenomenalisme des proprietes mentales

On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions.

Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility

SUMMARY : In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledgein his book Authority and Estrangement . After presenting the main lines of hisaccount, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have someshortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account wouldseem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerningbeliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems,according to which they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependenton the will. KEY WORDS : first person, belief, deliberation, avowals RESUMEN : Este trabajo se ocupa de la concepcion del autoconocimiento…

Sinopsis de "El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico"

Précis of El libre albedrío. Un estudio filosófico
  
 En este libro nos hemos planteado varios objetivos. En primer lugar, ofrecer al lector una guía o mapa que le oriente en el complejo territorio del debate sobre el libre albedrío. En segundo lugar, abogar por una determinada concepción del libre albedrío, a saber, el libertarismo, frente a otras posibles, en especial el compatibilismo. En tercer lugar, defender la existencia del libre albedrío frente a diversos desafíos, de tipos también diversos, que la ponen en cuestión.

Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”

In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2 . After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzing its structure, I distinguish two strategies of Lockie's to defend PAP against it, which I call 'No True Alternative Decision' (NTAD) and 'No Responsibility' (NR), respectively. According to…

Free will and open alternatives

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen,…

Content, Meaning and Truth

Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism

Respuestas a los comentaristas

Replies to commentators
 
 Respuestas a los comentarios críticos de Carlos Patarroyo, Mirja Pérez de Calleja y Pablo Rychter.

Emociones, racionalidad y responsabilidad

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Book Review: Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Creencia, significado y escepticismo

Las consideraciones antiescépticas desarrolladas por Davidson, como las de Putnam, tienen un carácter trascendental: parten de hechos que el escéptico ha de aceptar y tratan de mostrar que tales hechos no lo serían si las hipótesis escépticas fuesen verdaderas. Es dudoso que dichas consideraciones consigan realmente su objetivo. Sin embargo, no creo que Davidson estuviera realmente interesado en una refutación detallada del escepticismo. Su interés se centra más bien en el contexto del que surge: la imagen cartesiana de las relaciones entre subjetividad, intersubjetividad y objetividad. Y el verdadero valor de las reflexiones antiescépticas de Davidson reside en la imagen alternativa que la…

Alternatives and Responsibility: An Asymmetrical Approach

En este trabajo defiendo una visión asimétrica sobre la relación entre las posibilidades alternativas y la responsabilidad moral, según la cual se requiere tener posibilidades alternativas para ser culpable por lo que uno decide o hace, pero no para ser laudable por ello. Defiendo la no necesidad de alternativas para ser laudable a través de un examen de lo que yo llamo “ejemplos Lutero”. Mi defensa de la necesidad de alternativas para ser culpable procede en cambio mediante un análisis de los llamados “casos Frankfurt”. En ambos casos, mis argumentos se basan en la afirmación según la cual, en las adscripciones de responsabilidad moral, la cuestión principal no es si el agente podría haber…

Introduction: responsibility for action and belief

Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in conne...