Search results for "Bargaining"
showing 10 items of 66 documents
The Concept of Labour Market Flexicurity in the Eurozone
2013
This chapter discusses the evolution of the idea of a flexible labour market as a smooth shock absorber in case of asymmetric shocks. The concept of flexible labour markets became an institutionally well-established concept when the OECD constructed its index of labour market strictness. The OECD recognised, however, the weakness of its narrow approach and the European Commission put forward the more novel notion of flexicurity. Next, this chapter explains how the proposal of the concept of flexicurity aims at reaching a reasonable agreement between both the efficiency and the security principles by taking into consideration the interest of all the stakeholders in the labour market, includi…
Legal Issues Affecting Labour Market Integration of Migrants in Finland
2021
AbstractFinland has only relatively recently become a country of immigration, and as a result most immigration and integration policy legislation is also relatively recent. Since the 1990s, the number of migrants to Finland has increased steadily, motivating the adoption of various policy measures to regulate migration and support integration. From the perspective of migrant labour market integration, the two most important legislative acts are the Aliens Act (FINLEX 301/2004) and the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (FINLEX 1386/2010), which lay out basic labour market integration supports for migrants, and determine who can work in Finland and on which grounds. Finland’s comp…
Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors
2013
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protoc…
Coordination of Wage Bargaining, Exchange Rate Stability and External Adjustment
2016
The literature on the determinants of the rate of current account reversion has been limited to examining the role of exchange rate regimes. We propose that the degree of coordination of wage bargaining affects the speed of current account adjustment. Our point estimates are economically and statistically significant, suggesting that fragmented firm-level wage bargaining facilitates external adjustment. We also find a strong negative interaction between the effects of coordination of wage bargaining and exchange rate stability on the rate of current account reversion.
Commitment and strikes in wage bargaining
2000
Abstract This paper analyzes the long-run strategic relationship between a firm and a union as a repeated bargaining game, where there is incomplete information on the player's motivation on both sides and each party has a fall-back position. The firm and the union will engage in a reputation-building activity, that will produce a limited number of strikes over time. The bargainer that succeeds in building up a reputation for toughness and obtains a favorable payoff in the long-run is, either the more patient (or alternatively the more centralized), or the party with a higher initial probability of stubbornness, or the party with a smaller fall-back position. Our model also offers predictio…
Participation Costs for Responders Can Reduce Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Bargaining
2008
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
Reforma laboral y desregulación del mercado de trabajo
2017
Cuando se cumplen cinco años de su imposición unilateral por el gobierno conservador, el balance de la reforma laboral contradice en la práctica los objetivos retóricos con los que se pretendió justificarla (creación de empleo de calidad, flexibilidad interna como alternativa a los despidos, adaptabilidad de las relaciones laborales) y pone de manifiesto la agenda oculta de sus promotores políticos y empresariales (precariedad contractual, devaluación salarial, debilitamiento de la negociación colectiva, aumento de la desigualdad). El presente artículo trata de evaluar el impacto de la reforma en la desregulación de las relaciones laborales, con especial referencia al empleo, la negociación…
Seniority rules, worker mobility and wages : evidence from multi-country linked employer-employee data
2018
We construct multi-country employer-employee data to examine the consequences of last-in, first-out rules. We identify the effects by comparing worker exit rates between different units of the same firms operating in Sweden and Finland, two countries that have different seniority rules. We observe a relatively lower exit rate for more senior workers in Sweden in the shrinking firms and among the low-wage workers. These empirical patterns are consistent with last-in, first-out rules in Sweden providing protection from dismissals for the more senior workers among the worker groups to whom the rules are most relevant. Similarly, we observe a steeper seniority-wage profile in Sweden, suggesting…
Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes
2012
Abstract We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee–employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.
Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences
2004
This paper focuses on the formation, evolution and stability of the distribution of preferences in the population and its relationship with the investment and bargaining strategies in a simplified hold up problem. More precisely, in our model a population of infinitely-lived players (say, for example, firms) with homogeneous selfish or self-regarding preferences is pair-wise matched at each period with a population of an equal size of short-lived players (say, for example, workers) with heterogeneous preferences. Both types of player play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide separately but simultaneously whether to make a general or a relation-specific investment. The latter ty…