Search results for "Consciousness"

How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness—A critical review of existing positions and suggestions for future research

2011

In this paper, we address the different ways in which dream research can contribute to interdisciplinary consciousness research. As a second global state of consciousness aside from wakefulness, dreaming is an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness. However, programmatic suggestions for integrating dreaming into broader theories of consciousness, for instance by regarding dreams as a model system of standard or pathological wake states, have not yielded straightforward results. We review existing proposals for using dreaming as a model system, taking into account concerns about the concept of modeling and the adequacy and practical feasibility of dreaming as a mod…

2018

This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment, merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social hallucinations…

Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.

2008

We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the ‘I’ of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent e…

Implicit learning and statistical learning: one phenomenon, two approaches.

2006

The domain-general learning mechanisms elicited in incidental learning situations are of potential interest in many research fields, including language acquisition, object knowledge formation and motor learning. They have been the focus of studies on implicit learning for nearly 40 years. Stemming from a different research tradition, studies on statistical learning carried out in the past 10 years after the seminal studies by Saffran and collaborators, appear to be closely related, and the similarity between the two approaches is strengthened further by their recent evolution. However, implicit learning and statistical learning research favor different interpretations, focusing on the forma…

The experience of no experience Elevator UX and the role of unconscious experience

2013

Elevators are designed to facilitate the smooth and efficient transportation of people from one architectural floor to the next. If they work well, people should not think about the journey at all. Instead, their concentration should remain focused on the activity they were engaged in before entering the elevator usage interaction. In other words, if the design works properly, people should not consciously experience elevator interaction. This paper presents the issue of studying no (conscious) user experience. It takes a theoretical perspective to explain aspects of consciousness and embodiment. While most studies on user experience focus on remarkable and affective interaction experiences…

2020

Abstract This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and sho…

Towards a model-based cognitive neuroscience of stopping - a neuroimaging perspective.

2018

Our understanding of the neural correlates of response inhibition has greatly advanced over the last decade. Nevertheless the specific function of regions within this stopping network remains controversial. The traditional neuroimaging approach cannot capture many processes affecting stopping performance. Despite the shortcomings of the traditional neuroimaging approach and a great progress in mathematical and computational models of stopping, model-based cognitive neuroscience approaches in human neuroimaging studies are largely lacking. To foster model-based approaches to ultimately gain a deeper understanding of the neural signature of stopping, we outline the most prominent models of re…

Methods for studying unconscious learning

2005

One has to face numerous difficulties when trying to establish a dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this paper, we review several of these problems as well as the different methodological solutions that have been proposed to address them. We suggest that each of the different methodological solutions offered refers to a different operational definition of consciousness, and present empirical examples of sequence learning studies in which these different procedures were applied to differentiate between implicit and explicit knowledge acquisition. We also show how the use of a sensitive behavioral method, the process dissociation procedure, confers a distinctive adva…

Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference

2003

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of “phenomenal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-represen…

Commentary on Jakab's “Ineffability of Qualia”

2000

Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to the theory of mental representation employed. Jakab's starting assumption is that there is no linguistic description of a given experience such that understanding t…