Search results for "Econometrics"

Mobile phone data statistics as a dynamic proxy indicator in assessing regional economic activity and human commuting patterns

2020

Financial Fragility and Interacting Units: an Exercise

2010

This paper assumes that financial fluctuations are the result of the dynamic interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions of individual financial units. The framework is designed as a heterogeneous agent model which proceeds through discrete time steps within a finite time horizon. The interaction at the microlevel between financial units and the market maker, who is in charge of clearing the market, produces interesting complex dynamics. The model is analyzed by means of numerical simulations and agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach. The behaviour and evolution of financial units are studied for different parameter regimes in order to show the importance of the param…

The shape of small sample biases in pricing kernel estimations

2016

AbstractNumerous empirical studies find pricing kernels that are not-monotonically decreasing; the findings are at odds with the pricing kernel being marginal utility of a risk-averse, so-called representative agent. We study in detail the common procedure which estimates the pricing kernel as the ratio of two separate density estimations. In the first step, we analyse theoretically the functional dependence for the ratio of a density to its estimated density; this cautions the reader regarding potential computational issues coupled with statistical techniques. In the second step, we study this quantitatively; we show that small sample biases shape the estimated pricing kernel, and that est…

Market reaction to a bid-ask spread change: a power-law relaxation dynamics.

2009

We study the relaxation dynamics of the bid-ask spread and of the midprice after a sudden variation of the spread in a double auction financial market. We find that the spread decays as a power law to its normal value. We measure the price reversion dynamics and the permanent impact, i.e., the long-time effect on price, of a generic event altering the spread and we find an approximately linear relation between immediate and permanent impact. We hypothesize that the power-law decay of the spread is a consequence of the strategic limit order placement of liquidity providers. We support this hypothesis by investigating several quantities, such as order placement rates and distribution of price…

Collusion constrained equilibrium

2018

We study collusion within groups in non-cooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to non-overlapping groups and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put positive probability on alternatives that are suboptimal for the group in certain razor's edge cases where the set of incentive compatible plans changes discontinuously. These collusion constrained e…

Collusion Constrained Equilibrium

2018

First published: 01 February 2018 This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0 (http://econtheory.org) We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put positive probability on alternatives …

Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

2002

The main contribution of this paper is the development and application of cryptographic techniques to the design of strategic communication mechanisms. One of the main assumptions in cryptography is the limitation of the computational power available to agents. We introduce the concept of limited computational complexity, and by borrowing results from cryptography, we construct a communication protocol to establish that every correlated equilibrium of a two-person game with rational payoffs can be achieved by means of computationally restricted unmediated communication. This result provides an example in game theory where limitations of computational abilities of players are helpful in solv…

TUG-OF-WAR, MARKET MANIPULATION, AND OPTION PRICING

2014

We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-war game involving the the issuer and holder of the option. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated in a multi-dimensional financial market and the agents try, respectively, to manipulate/control the drift and the volatility of the asset processes in order to minimize and maximize the expected discounted pay-off defined at the terminal date $T$. We prove that the game has a value and that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to a terminal value problem for a partial differential equation involving the non-linear and completely degenerate parabolic infinity Laplace operator.

The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

2016

ABSTRACTIn this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.

Pragmatic languages with universal grammars

2012

Abstract This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiverʼs strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Senderʼs signaling strategy is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when the Receiver responds best to the Senderʼs strategy, the Sender has no incentive to deviate. An example shows that a tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the block…