Search results for "Game Theory"
showing 10 items of 498 documents
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
2002
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases t…
Determinants of evaluation of team performance
1976
Abstract.— The purpose of this study was to examine factors affecting the evaluation of the achievement behavior of a group. Subjects were asked to play the role of team members who have to convey their feedback to the whole team right after the performance. 214 subjects (males and females, high and low achievers) evaluated the achievement behavior of a group, a sports team. They were given knowledge of the group's performance outcomes (5 outcomes from clear win to clear loss), of the group's ability (yes or no) and of the effort (yes or no) expended by the group members. These factors yielded the 20 situations judged by each subject. In addition, half of the subjects evaluated a team perfo…
Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict.
2011
Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tenden…
ChemInform Abstract: New Structural Aspects of 3-Vinyl-1H-indoles for Predicting the Outcome of Diels-Alder Reactions
1989
Some selected 3-vinyl-1H-indoles have been synthesised and the first13C-NMR studies performed; in addition He(Iα) photoelectron spectra and the results of perturbation MO calculations of some examples of this class of compounds are presented. The molecular characteristics obtained thereby can be used to predict the results of [π4s+π2s]-cycloaddition reactions with 3-vinylindoles.
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA): Guidelines for research practice in Information Systems and marketing
2021
Abstract The increasing interest in fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) in Information Systems and marketing raises the need for a tutorial paper that discusses the basic concepts and principles of the method, provide answers to typical questions that editors, reviewers, and authors would have when dealing with a new tool of analysis, and practically guide researchers on how to employ fsQCA. This article helps the reader to gain richer information from their data and understand the importance of avoiding shallow information‐from‐data reporting. To this end, it proposes a different research paradigm that includes asymmetric, configurational‐focused case‐outcome theory construc…
Game-Theoretic Learning and Allocations in Robust Dynamic Coalitional Games
2019
The problem of allocation in coalitional games with noisy observations and dynamic environments is considered. The evolution of the excess is modeled by a stochastic differential inclusion involvin...
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
Online Pricing via Stackelberg and Incentive Games in a Micro-Grid
2019
This paper deals with the analysis and design of online pricing mechanisms in micro-grids. Two cases are studied in which the market layer is modeled as an open-loop and closed-loop dynamical system respectively. In the case of open-loop market dynamics, the price is generated as equilibrium price of a Stackelberg game with an incentive strategy. In such Stackelberg game, the leader is the energy supplier, the follower is the consumer, and the leader plays an incentive strategy. In the case of closed-loop market dynamics, the price is obtained as a function of the power supplied and the demand. A stability analysis is provided for both cases, which sheds light on the transient and steady-st…
Crowd-Averse Cyber-Physical Systems: The Paradigm of Robust Mean-Field Games
2016
For a networked controlled system, we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and $H_{\infty}$ - optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. First, we establish a mean-field system for such games including the effects of adversarial disturbances. Second, we identify the optimal response of the individuals for a given population behavior. Third, we provide an analysis of equilibria and their stability.