Search results for "Mathematical Economics"

SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH

1998

Opinion dynamics in coalitional games with transferable utilities

2014

This paper studies opinion dynamics in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. For each game, which we can see as a “small world”, the players share opinions on how to allocate revenues based on the mean-field interactions with the other small worlds. As a result of such mean-field interactions among small worlds, in each game, a central planner allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The paper also studies the convergence and stability of op…

A Control Problem for a Class of Epidemics

2003

We consider a mathematical model corresponding to a class of epidemics. Controlling an epidemic is usually difficult. To implement the control policy suggested by a mathematical analysis in the real world is never easy. However, suggestions can be given to the public authorities about the effects of a particular control policy, and in this sense analysis and simulation by mathematical models becomes a powerful tool.

On the limits to the long-period method in classical economics. A note

2001

On a first reading of Theory of Production, Kurz & Salvadori (1995) appear to confine the empirical domain of the long-period models of the classical theory of value and distribution to stationary economies with non-constant returns to scale and to growing economies with constant returns to scale. Such a reading is shown to be untenable since it merges the two levels of exploring the extension of a model and of testing a theoretical hypothesis. Conversely, the way Kurz & Salvadori tackle the problems of price dynamics and returns to scale in growing economies is shown to be compatible with what appears to be Sraffa's (implicit) strategy of research.

BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE

2006

We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.

Quantum like modelling of decision making: quantifying uncertainty with the aid of the Heisenberg-Robertson inequality

2018

This paper contributes to quantum-like modeling of decision making (DM) under uncertainty through application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (in the form of the Robertson inequality). In this paper we apply this instrument to quantify uncertainty in DM performed by quantum-like agents. As an example, we apply the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to the determination of mutual interrelation of uncertainties for “incompatible questions” used to be asked in political opinion pools. We also consider the problem of representation of decision problems, e.g., in the form of questions, by Hermitian operators, commuting and noncommuting, corresponding to compatible and incompatible questions …

Pure Component Pricing in a Duopoly

2002

In this paper, we focus on price competition between several multiproduct firms which produce differentiated systems, each consisting of two complementary products. It is shown here that if firms are restricted to pure component pricing (bundling is not allowed) whenever components produced are compatible, pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. With the use of bundling strategies, pure strategy equilibrium always exists. For the pure component pricing case we provide a full characterization for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.

On the Conditions of Price Consistency in the Input-Output Model

2013

The input-ouput model remains the basis of most SAM or CGE models. It actually uses two periods: the prices indexes solve it with the current period coefficients; the corresponding physical model is monoperiodic: the current prices solve it with the base period coefficients. The Leontief model is not consistent --- both models diverge generally --- unless the interindustry matrix of direct and indirect quantities of labor is stable over time. This implies that the vertically integrated labor coefficients are stable. This assumption is satisfied when the physical production coefficients and the physical labor coefficients are stable over time, two very strong assumptions.

Game-Theoretic Learning and Allocations in Robust Dynamic Coalitional Games

2019

The problem of allocation in coalitional games with noisy observations and dynamic environments is considered. The evolution of the excess is modeled by a stochastic differential inclusion involvin...

A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma

2016

We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…