Search results for "Oligopoly"
showing 10 items of 41 documents
Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?
2009
International audience; France Telecom (FT), SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT) have been fined by France's Conseil de la Concurrence (CC) for organizing a mobile phone cartel with stable market shares (one-half, one-third and one-sixth, respectively) and for directly exchanging commercial information. While not contesting the legal decision, it is argued here that the economic reasoning is flawed. (1) As the CC made much of the firms' stable market shares, we have first followed this line of reasoning by considering that the market shares are quotas under uniform costs. Even if there is a general incentive to form a monopolistic cartel, BT was too small for it to be worth its while to join it; it i…
Evaluation de la concurrence généralisée : un outil matriciel
1993
Input-output matrices and structural analysis are applied to the analysis and forecast of consequences of offensive actions in the case of multiproduct multimarket large firms.
Growth and sustainability of agricultural systems: the case of Sicilian wine-growing farms
2016
International audience; The Sicilian wine-growing sector is characterised by the presence on the one hand of many small enterprises that limit their activity to the first stage of the supply chain (field production) and on the other of few enterprises that adopt a strategy of total vertical integration, from the production to the sale of wine. The first group of enterprises operates in a competitive market and in many cases with marginal revenues that are lower than marginal costs, leading entrepreneurs to abandon the activity of grape production. The second group operates in an oligopolistic market and it is able to compete in an international market. Findings reveal that competitive advan…
Les followers ont-ils vraiment de l'importance dans le modèle de Stackelberg?
2011
In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts.
The beer market and advertising expenditure
2009
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of advertising expenditure on brands' market shares, utilizing a novel four‐week advertising‐sales data from the highly competitive oligopolistic Finnish beer market in which price competition among the homogeneous larger‐type beer brands is not allowed during the period of the study.Design/methodology/approachCompetition is modelled using the Lanchester model. The impacts of advertising on market shares are estimated using the impulse‐response functions from vector autoregression, and the full information maximum likelihood and advertising elasticities.FindingsSome new insights into beer market dynamics are obtained. First, the imp…
“Let’s make lots of money”: the determinants of performance in the recorded music sector
2017
This research analyzes the performance of 467 record labels in eight European countries over a period of 13 years (2003-2015). The main goal is to explain a relative measure of profitability in terms of observed variables, although the nature of the dataset also allows us to include non-observed firm and country effects. To this end alternative models are estimated and three main research questions are tested, namely: (1) the effect of the dual structure of the recorded music market, in which a competitive segment and an oligopoly coexist; (2) the extent and source of the volatility of profits in record labels; and (3) the nonlinear impact of size on performance.
R&D WITH SPILLOVERS: MONOPOLY VERSUS NONCOOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE DUOPOLY
2010
This paper compares industry profit and R&D propensity for a duopoly conducting either noncooperative or cooperative R&D and a monopoly, using two different basic models of strategic R&D. One postulates spillovers in R&D inputs and predicts that equilibrium joint profit and R&D levels are always larger under monopoly. The other postulates spillovers in R&D outputs and sometimes predicts that joint profit and R&D levels are larger under either of the alternative scenarios. In addition, unlike input spillovers, spillovers in R&D outputs sometimes exert a positive effect on both effective and private noncooperative R&D levels.
Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing
2003
Abstract The main objects here are games in which players mainly compete but nonetheless collaborate on some subsidiary activities. Play assumes a two-stage nature in that first-stage moves presume coordination of some subsequent tasks. Specifically, we consider instances where second-stage coordination amounts to partial cost sharing, anticipated and sustained as a core solution. Examples include regional Cournot oligopolies with joint transportation. We define and characterize equilibria, and inquire about their existence.
Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment
2007
We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantitysetting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well-known tension between the fixed set-up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and…
R&D Network Formation with Myopic and Farsighted Firms
2018
We study the formation of R&D networks when each firm benefits from the research done by other firms it is connected to. Firms can be either myopic or farsighted when deciding about the links they want to form. We propose the notion of myopic-farsighted stable set to determine the R&D networks that emerge in the long run. When the majority of firms is myopic, stability leads to R&D networks consisting of either two asymmetric components with the largest component comprises three-quarters of firms or two symmetric components of nearly equal size with the largest component having only myopic firms. But, once the majority of firms becomes farsighted, only R&D networks with two asymmetric compo…