Search results for "jel:L1"
showing 10 items of 37 documents
A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency
1998
Abstract An enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency, the distance of firms inside a frontier, following the model of Farrell (Farrell, 1957. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 120 (3), 253–290). We propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure. The theory is based on the idea that workers can bargain low `effort' (high crew sizes etc.) if they and the firm have some monopoly power. We provide simple theoretical expressions for the empirical measures of technical and allocative efficiency and compare them to those in the statistical literature. We also consider the re…
Vertical integration and exclusivities in maritime freight transport
2011
A key recent theme in maritime freight transport is the involvement of shipping lines in terminal management. Such investments are costly but allow liners to provide better service. Most of these new terminals are dedicated terminals but some are non-exclusive and let rivals access them for a fee. In this paper, we show that a shipping line that builds its own terminal finds it strategically profitable (i) to continue routing part of its cargo through the open port facilities, and (ii) to keep its terminal non-exclusive. In this way, the liner investor pushes part of the rival's freight from the open to the new terminal. Besides, under non-exclusivities, the shipping lines offer a wider var…
R&D, Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation Revisited
2012
In this paper, we have presented a generalization of Bucci's (2003) model in which have disentangled the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization in order to have a better measurement of competition. Indeed, unlike Bucci (2003), in our model, the measure of competition is completely independent of the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization. Our main finding is that, unlike Bucci (2003), we show that the competition does not play any role in growth. This result is explained by the complementarity of innovation and human capital assumed in the research produ…
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
2013
Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/ In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thr…
Les effets macroéconomiques sur la productivité et les prix de vastes réformes structurelles sur les marchés des biens et du travail
2015
La présente analyse vise à caractériser les effets « directs » et « indirects » des régulations sur le marché des biens ainsi que les effets des régulations sur le marché du travail, sur la productivité et sur les prix. L’analyse est empirique et réalisée via des estimations sur un panel de quatorze pays sur la période 1987-2007, et quand cela est possible sur des donnés sectorielles (treize secteurs manufacturiers et cinq secteurs des services et réseaux). Au terme de ces estimations, il est possible de caractériser les effets de la mise en oeuvre de réformes structurelles. Les réformes structurelles consistent ici en une baisse des indicateurs de régulations sur les marchés des biens et d…
Networks of knowledge among unionized firms
2008
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) an…
Networks of manufacturers and retailers
2011
We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution & non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution & exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a dif…
R&D networks among unionized firms
2005
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unio…
Endogenous firm asymmetry and cooperative R&D in linear duopoly with spillovers
2005
In a linear model ofcost reducing R&D/Cournot competition, firm asymmetry is shown to be sustainable as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with R&D competition only ifthe productivity of research is sufficiently large relative to the benefits from imitation. In such a case, industry-wide cost reduction and firms asymmetry are increasing and decreasing functions of the spillover rate, respectively. In the absence of spillovers, a symmetric joint lab generates higher consumer surplus and social welfare than a pair ofasymmetric competitors. If spillovers are not too small, asymmetric R&D competition is advantageous toconsumers, but not to firms.
Competing Against Simulated Equilibrium Price Dispersions: An Experiment on Internet-Assisted Search Markets
2005
In a four-treatment experiment, we test some of the hypotheses in García-Gallego et al. (2004) concerning competition among a number of firms of which some (or all) are indexed by a price-comparison engine facilitating buyers’ search process. In this paper, we isolate individual behavior from noise due to other players’ actions and learning, facing each subject with simulated rivals whose prices are extracted from mixed strategy equilibrium distributions. We find systematic deviations from both theoretical distributions and previous data obtained in sessions where all players were human. Specifically, departures of experimental data from the corresponding theoretical predictions are enhance…