Search results for "jel:L1"
showing 10 items of 37 documents
Equilibrium mergers in a composite good industry with efficiencies
2014
This paper studies equilibrium merging behavior in composite good industries. Component producers face the option to either merge with a similar component producer (horizontal merger) or a complementary one (complementary merger) of a composite good. Focusing only on strategic reasons, complementary mergers arise at equilibrium only when composite goods are very differentiated while horizontal mergers otherwise. Next, when efficiencies are considered, the level of marginal cost saving required for a horizontal merger in a composite industry to result in a non- increase in the upward price pressure index (UPPI) is greater as compared with the one in a regular industry. This result can be use…
Quality pricing-to-market
2014
We examine firm's pricing-to-market decisions in vertically differentiated industries featuring a large number of firms that compete monopolistically in the quality space. Firms sell goods of heterogeneous quality to consumers with non-homothetic preferences that differ in their income and thus their marginal willingness to pay for quality increments. We derive closed-form solutions for the pricing game under costly international trade, thus establishing existence and uniqueness. We then examine how the interaction of good quality and market demand for quality affects firms' pricing-to-market decisions. The relative price of high quality goods compared to that of low quality goods is an inc…
The determinants of net interest income in the Mexican banking system: An integrated model
2009
This paper analyzes net interest income in the Mexican banking system over the period 1993-2005. Taking as reference the seminal work by Ho and Saunders (1981) and subsequent extensions by other authors, our study models the net interest margin simultaneously including operating costs and diversification and specialization as determinants of the margin. The results referring to the Mexican case show that its high margins can be explained mainly by average operating costs and by market power. Although non-interest income has increased in recent years, its economic impact is low. El trabajo analiza el margen de intermediación de la banca Mexicana en el periodo 1996-2005. Tomando como referenc…
Competing Against Simulated Equilibrium Price Dispersions: An Experiment on Internet-Assisted Search Markets
2005
In a four-treatment experiment, we test some of the hypotheses in García-Gallego et al. (2004) concerning competition among a number of firms of which some (or all) are indexed by a price-comparison engine facilitating buyers’ search process. In this paper, we isolate individual behavior from noise due to other players’ actions and learning, facing each subject with simulated rivals whose prices are extracted from mixed strategy equilibrium distributions. We find systematic deviations from both theoretical distributions and previous data obtained in sessions where all players were human. Specifically, departures of experimental data from the corresponding theoretical predictions are enhance…
Inflation dynamics in a model with firm entry and (some) heterogeneity
2014
We analyse the incidence of endogenous entry and firm TFP-heterogeneity on the response of aggregate inflation to exogenous shocks. We build up an otherwise standard DSGE model in which the number of firms is endogenously determined and firms differ in their steady state level of productivity. This splits the industry structure into firms of different sizes. Calibrating the different transition rates, across firm sizes and out of the market we reproduce the main features of the distribution of firms in Spain. We then compare the inflation response to technology, interest rate and entry cost shocks, among others. We find that structures in which large (more productive) firms predominate tend…
ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH FREE ENTRY
2006
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and then compete in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. Sequential entry is never observed. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of incumbents is given, entry is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level.
A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency
1998
Abstract An enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency, the distance of firms inside a frontier, following the model of Farrell (Farrell, 1957. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 120 (3), 253–290). We propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure. The theory is based on the idea that workers can bargain low `effort' (high crew sizes etc.) if they and the firm have some monopoly power. We provide simple theoretical expressions for the empirical measures of technical and allocative efficiency and compare them to those in the statistical literature. We also consider the re…
L'incidence des LBO sur la politique d'investissement et la gestion opérationnelle des firmes acquises:le cas français
2002
Cet article étudie dans quelle mesure la politique d'investissement ainsi que la gestion opérationnelle des firmes françaises reprises dans le cadre d'un leveraged buy-out (LBO) peuvent expliquer la dégradation de leur surperformance après l'opération. L'étude empirique porte sur 132 LBO réalisés en France de 1989 à 1994. Les résultats obtenus montrent qu'on ne peut expliquer la réduction anormale de la rentabilité économique de ces firmes par un effet mécanique imputable à des surinvestissements, ni par une dérive de la gestion de leurs actifs et passifs d'exploitation. En revanche, l'augmentation des frais de personnels ainsi que des consommations intermédiaires et/ou des réductions de pr…
Allocating cost reducing investments over competing divisions
2007
This paper examines a three-stage model of divisionalization where, first, two parent firms create independent units, second, the parent firms allocate cost reduction levels over these units, and third, the resulting units compete in a Cournot market given their current costs of production. The introduction of the cost reduction phase is shown to reduce the incentives toward divisionalization severely, relative to other existing models. Namely, the scope for divisionalization in equilibrium reduces as the marginal cost of the cost reducing investment decreases, and eventually vanishes. A second-best welfare analysis shows that, for any given market structure, the equilibrium investment deci…
Les followers ont-ils vraiment de l'importance dans le modèle de Stackelberg?
2011
In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts.