6533b838fe1ef96bd12a46f1

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game

Salvatore ModicaDavid K. LevineFelipe ZuritaFederico Weinschelbaum

subject

education.field_of_studyPunishmentEvolutionmedia_common.quotation_subjectPopulationjel:C73Impatiencejel:C78PatienceDecision problemEconomía y NegociosMicroeconomicsCIENCIAS SOCIALESEconomics Econometrics and Finance (all)2001 Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)Otras Economía y NegociosEconomicsEvolutionary Game TheoryeducationReplicator DynamicsGeneral Economics Econometrics and FinanceMathematical economicsmedia_common

description

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction. Fil: Levine, David K.. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos Fil: Modica, Salvatore. Università Degli Studi Di Palermo; Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Chile

10.1257/mic.20130188https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20130188