Search results for " Game theory"
showing 10 items of 120 documents
Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
2002
The main contribution of this paper is the development and application of cryptographic techniques to the design of strategic communication mechanisms. One of the main assumptions in cryptography is the limitation of the computational power available to agents. We introduce the concept of limited computational complexity, and by borrowing results from cryptography, we construct a communication protocol to establish that every correlated equilibrium of a two-person game with rational payoffs can be achieved by means of computationally restricted unmediated communication. This result provides an example in game theory where limitations of computational abilities of players are helpful in solv…
TUG-OF-WAR, MARKET MANIPULATION, AND OPTION PRICING
2014
We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-war game involving the the issuer and holder of the option. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated in a multi-dimensional financial market and the agents try, respectively, to manipulate/control the drift and the volatility of the asset processes in order to minimize and maximize the expected discounted pay-off defined at the terminal date $T$. We prove that the game has a value and that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to a terminal value problem for a partial differential equation involving the non-linear and completely degenerate parabolic infinity Laplace operator.
The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance
2016
ABSTRACTIn this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.
Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
2012
Abstract This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiverʼs strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Senderʼs signaling strategy is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when the Receiver responds best to the Senderʼs strategy, the Sender has no incentive to deviate. An example shows that a tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the block…
A multiplicative potential approach to solutions for cooperative TU-games
2001
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative games with transferable utility, it is well-known that the Shapley value is the most appealing representative of the family of (not necessarily efficient) game-theoretic solutions with an additive potential representation. This paper introduces a new solution concept, called Multiplicativily Proportional ($MP$) value, that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value if the additive potential approach to the solution theory is replaced by a multiplicative potential approach in that the difference of two potential evaluations is replaced by its quotient. One out of two main equivalence theorems states that every solution with a multip…
Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games
2011
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We assume that the players in the game interact only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary over time. The main contributions of the paper are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the players' communication graphs.
Non-cooperative power allocation game with imperfect sensing information for cognitive radio
2012
In this paper, we consider a sensing-based spectrum sharing scenario and present an efficient decentralized algorithm to maximize the total throughput of the cognitive radio users by optimizing jointly both the detection operation and the power allocation, taking into account the influence of the sensing accuracy. This optimization problem can be formulated as a distributed non-cooperative power allocation game, which can be solved by using an alternating direction optimization method. The transmit power budget of the cognitive radio users and the constraint related to the rate-loss of the primary user due to the interference are considered in the scheme. Finally, we use variational inequal…
Efficient Parallel Nash Genetic Algorithm for Solving Inverse Problems in Structural Engineering
2015
A parallel implementation of a game-theory based Nash Genetic Algorithm (Nash-GAs) is presented in this paper for solving reconstruction inverse problems in structural engineering. We compare it with the standard panmictic genetic algorithm in a HPC environment with up to eight processors. The procedure performance is evaluated on a fifty-five bar sized test case of discrete real cross-section types structural frame. Numerical results obtained on this application show a significant achieved increase of performance using the parallel Nash-GAs approach compared to the standard GAs or Parallel GAs.
Local regularity for time-dependent tug-of-war games with varying probabilities
2016
We study local regularity properties of value functions of time-dependent tug-of-war games. For games with constant probabilities we get local Lipschitz continuity. For more general games with probabilities depending on space and time we obtain H\"older and Harnack estimates. The games have a connection to the normalized $p(x,t)$-parabolic equation $(n+p(x,t))u_t=\Delta u+(p(x,t)-2) \Delta_{\infty}^N u$.
Provable Advantage for Quantum Strategies in Random Symmetric XOR Games
2013
Non-local games are widely studied as a model to investigate the properties of quantum mechanics as opposed to classical mechanics. In this paper, we consider a subset of non-local games: symmetric XOR games of $n$ players with 0-1 valued questions. For this class of games, each player receives an input bit and responds with an output bit without communicating to the other players. The winning condition only depends on XOR of output bits and is constant w.r.t. permutation of players. We prove that for almost any $n$-player symmetric XOR game the entangled value of the game is $\Theta (\frac{\sqrt{\ln{n}}}{n^{1/4}})$ adapting an old result by Salem and Zygmund on the asymptotics of random tr…