Search results for "jel:D4"
showing 10 items of 23 documents
The Stackelberg equilibrium as a consistent conjectural equilibrium
2011
International audience; We consider a static game with conjectural variations where some firms make conjectures while others do not. Two propositions are proved. We first show that there exists a continuum of conjectural variations such that the conjectural equilibrium locally coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium (Proposition 1). Second, we define the conditions under which a conjectural equilibrium is a locally consistent equilibrium (i.e. such that conjectures are fulfilled). The conceptof (local) consistency is restricted to firms making conjectures. Two conditions on consistency are featured: consistency within a cohort and consistency among cohorts. The Stackelberg equilibrium fu…
Adam Smith on Monopoly Theory. Making good a lacuna
2014
This article analyses Adam Smith's views on monopoly by focusing on Book IV and V of The Wealth of Nations. It argues that the majority of scholars have assessed Smith's analysis of monopoly starting from premises different from those, actually though implicitly, used by Smith. We show that Smith makes use of the word 'monopoly' to refer to a heterogeneous collection of market outcomes, besides that of a single seller market, and that Smith's account of monopolists' behaviour is richer than that provided by later theorists. We also show that Smith was aware of the growth-retarding effect of monopoly and urged State regulation. © 2014 Scottish Economic Society.
Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
2014
This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games with complete information, extending the insights by Chiesa and Denicolò (2009) to multiproduct markets with indivisibilities and where the agent's preferences need not be monotone. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules -mixed bundling prices- that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equil…
Multi-product firms and product variety
2008
The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a…
Unawareness and bankruptcy: A general equilibrium model
1998
International audience; We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided. An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee. An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states.
On the Fallacy of Forward Linkages: A Note in the Light of Recent Results
2009
Following on from de Mesnard’s (2009) radical criticism of the Ghosh supply-driven model, this paper draws the dramatic consequences for the widespread use of forward linkages in input-output analysis applied to regional science: the practice must be abandoned. The arguments are based on three points: (i) it is impossible simultaneously to choose the Leontief model for the backward effects and the Ghosh model for the forward effects; (ii) it is impossible simultaneously to consider a production function of complementary inputs (Leontief) and a production function of perfectly substitutable inputs (Ghosh); and most importantly (iii) price effects and output effects remain inextricably mixed …
Cross-country comparisons of competition and pricing power in European banking
2009
Abstract Studies of banking competition and competitive behavior both within and across countries typically utilise only one of the few measures that are available. In trying to assess the relative competitive position of banking markets in 14 European countries, existing indicators of competition are found to give conflicting predictions across countries, within countries, and over time. This is because indicators of competition tend to measure different things and are additionally influenced by cross-country differences in cost efficiency, fee income levels, real economic growth and inflation. We attempt to separate bank pricing power from these embodied influences and derive more consist…
FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS
2005
In this paper the optimal policy and the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market are studied. To analyze the stability, the tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories choose their tariff whereas the monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. The findings show that the optimal policy of the importers depends on which strategic variable is selected by the monopolist but that, on the contrary, this decision has no effects on the level of cooperation that can be reached b…
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers
2005
A duopoly model of cost reducing R&D-Cournot market competition is extended to encompass endogenous timing of R&D investments. Under the assumption that R&D spillovers are zero under simultaneous choices of R&D and only flow from the R&D leader to the follower under sequential choices, sequential and simultaneous play at the R&D stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry. The only timing structure of the R&D stage sustainable as subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and thus zero spillovers.
R&D, Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation Revisited
2012
In this paper, we have presented a generalization of Bucci's (2003) model in which have disentangled the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization in order to have a better measurement of competition. Indeed, unlike Bucci (2003), in our model, the measure of competition is completely independent of the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to specialization. Our main finding is that, unlike Bucci (2003), we show that the competition does not play any role in growth. This result is explained by the complementarity of innovation and human capital assumed in the research produ…