Search results for "legal positivism."
showing 10 items of 35 documents
Costituzione, diritti, democrazia. Analisi critica di tre pilastri della filosofia del diritto di Luigi Ferrajoli
2014
The essay discusses three key-concepts in Luigi Ferrajoli’s legal philosophy; these concepts are: constitution, legal positivism, and democracy. Ferrajoli articulates these concepts in an interestingly original way and, in his latest book La democrazia attraverso i diritti, also stresses their interconnection. The essay critically assesses Ferrajoli’s use of these concepts, and in the process also highlights some problems with Ferrajoli’s “formal” definition of fundamental rights.
Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals
2014
The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post-Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction…
Legal Science: Analytical Conceptions
2022
This entry is devoted to a survey of the main analytical conceptions of legal science. The focus will be in particular on (1) Alf Ross’s legal realism and his neo-positivistic approach to legal science; (2) Norberto Bobbio and the Italian analytical legal philosophical school, which firmly tie legal science to language analysis; (3) Herbert Hart and the analytical philosophy of ordinary language, and, eventually, (4) Ronald Dworkin and the interpretative turn.
Some arguments supporting an interpretative approach to legal knowledge
2014
La scienza giuridica di matrice giuspositivista istituisce un legame stringente tra diritto e linguaggio. Secondo questa prospettiva, il diritto è il discorso del legislatore e la scienza giuridica non è altro che un discorso sopra un discorso: un meta-linguaggio descrittivo del linguaggio prescrittivo del legislatore. Questa concezione del diritto e questo modello di scienza giuridica sono in crisi da alcuni decenni. Nel mio saggio presento quattro argomenti volti a evidenziare i limiti di questo approccio al diritto: l’argomento epistemologico, l’argomento del pluralismo epistemologico, l’argomento della svolta interpretativa e, infine, l’argomento funzionalista. Questi argomenti non stan…
Volpi e ricci, ovvero: che cosa rimane del positivismo giuridico?
2017
Sino alla prima metà del xx secolo tutti i principali giuspositivisti condividevano l’idea che il positivismo giuridico presupponesse necessariamente una meta-etica soggettivista e non-cognitivista. Il legame tra una meta-etica soggettivista e non-cognitivista e il positivismo giuridico ad un certo punto è stato reciso. Importanti giuspositivisti cominciano a mettere in discussione che il positivismo giuridico implichi una determinata prospettiva meta-etica. In questo saggio avanzo tre obiezioni al positivismo giuridico da cui che il positivismo giuridico può almeno in parte difendersi solo a condizione di rimanere fedele al soggettivismo e al non-cognitivismo Until the middle of the last c…
Inclusive Legal Positivism, Legal Interpretation, and Value-Judgments
2009
In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism. The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism. I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value-freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding sect…
Normative Legal Positivism, Neutrality, and the Rule of Law
2013
Usually, in jurisprudential debates what is discussed under the rubric of ‘neutrality’ is the claim that jurisprudence is (or at least can, and should be) a conceptual, or descriptive - thus, non-normative, or morally neutral - inquiry. I discuss neutrality in an altogether different sense, namely, neutrality as an ethico-political ideal the law should meet. My starting point is normative legal positivism, or the claim that it is a good and desirable thing that the laws have easily identifiable, readily accessible, as far as possible non-controversial social sources. What justifies normative legal positivism, I claim, is the value - or the ideal - of neutrality, suitably understood. I.e., w…
Zaufanie do prawa jako wartość i jego ochrona w porządku prawnym państwa
2023
The article presents the issue of trust in law as one of the fundamental values of a rule-of-law state. The analysis of the court rulings conducted in the first part of the article indicates the principle of a democratic rule-of-law state as a basis for distinguishing substantive and formal components of trust in law. Further considerations of the article focus on showing the change of law, in particular its transition from repressive law to responsive law, and the possible effects of this change on the paradigm of trust established in a democratic ruleof-law state. The effect of these transformations, as indicated by the considerations presented, affects the perception of the authority of …
Norma de reconocimiento, convención y obligación. Aquello che Shapiro todavía puede aprender de los errores de Hart
2019
Shapiro works out a version of legal positivism taking as its starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits of Hart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligation and normativity of law. In this paper I analyze the limits of Hart’s conception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planning theory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. To anticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicates Hart’s mistakes on this subject-matters. The paper is divided in three main sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction of Hart’s conception of normativity, reconstruction which is partially d…
‘What’s the Plan?’: On Interpretation and Meta-interpretation in Scott Shapiro’s Legality
2012
This chapter seeks to explain and evaluate Shapiro’s theory of legal interpretation, as it is outlined in his recent book ‘Legality’. More specifically, in the following I will try to provide (a) a reconstruction of Shapiro’s theory of legal interpretation, as it is developed in ‘Legality’; (b) an assessment of this theory of interpretation on its own terms (i.e. its internal coherence, its overall persuasiveness); and (c) an evaluation of the compatibility of this theory of legal interpretation with the general project of ‘law as plan’.