Search results for " Game theory"
showing 10 items of 120 documents
Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach
2008
We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
2003
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exits. The (subgame perfect) Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem's projection on the firms' price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers' value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central soluti…
Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium
2010
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the cost of memory goes to 0, includes the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. This result stands in sharp contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), who proved that when memory is free, the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played by players with bounded computational power is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded c…
Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs
2013
This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Introspection and equilibrium selection in 2 � 2 matrix games
1994
Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper models the introspection process by which the selected equilibrium is achieved in this class of games. Players begin their analysis with imprecise priors, obtained under weak restrictions formulated as Axioms. For a large class of reasoning dynamics we obtain as the solution the risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
Pricing of Forwards and Options in a Multivariate Non-Gaussian Stochastic Volatility Model for Energy Markets
2013
In Benth and Vos (2013) we introduced a multivariate spot price model with stochastic volatility for energy markets which captures characteristic features, such as price spikes, mean reversion, stochastic volatility, and inverse leverage effect as well as dependencies between commodities. In this paper we derive the forward price dynamics based on our multivariate spot price model, providing a very flexible structure for the forward curves, including contango, backwardation, and hump shape. Moreover, a Fourier transform-based method to price options on the forward is described.
Achieving Fair Bandwidth Distribution in WiFi Networks: A Game Theoretical Approach
2011
International audience; Achieving fair bandwidth distribution among uplink and downlink ows in IEEE 802.11 infrastructure networks is a complex issue, due to the well-known features of the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) which regulates the access to the shared medium. Indeed, the dynamic adaptation of the contention windows causes phenomena of short-term unfairness, while the use of homogeneous contention parameters among the contending nodes makes the aggregated downlink bandwidth equal to the uplink bandwidth of a single node. We propose a dynamic tuning of the contention parameters used by the nodes, based on simple network monitoring functionalities and rational strategies. Spe…
Characterization of the Clarke regularity of subanalytic sets
2017
International audience; In this note, we will show that for a closed subanalytic subset $A \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, the Clarke tangential regularity of $A$ at $x_0 \in A$ is equivalent to the coincidence of the Clarke's tangent cone to $A$ at $x_0$ with the set \\$$\mathcal{L}(A, x_0):= \bigg\{\dot{c}_+(0) \in \mathbb{R}^n: \, c:[0,1]\longrightarrow A\;\;\mbox{\it is Lipschitz}, \, c(0)=x_0\bigg\}.$$Where $\dot{c}_+(0)$ denotes the right-strict derivative of $c$ at $0$. The results obtained are used to show that the Clarke regularity of the epigraph of a function may be characterized by a new formula of the Clarke subdifferential of that function.
Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
2015
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction. Fil: Levine, David…
Large Networks of Dynamic Agents: Consensus under Adversarial Disturbances
2012
This paper studies interactions among homogeneous social groups within the framework of large population games. Each group is represented by a network and the behavior described by a two-player repeated game. The contribution is three-fold. Beyond the idea of providing a novel two-level model with repeated games at a lower level and population games at a higher level, we also establish a mean field equilibrium and study state feedback best-response strategies as well as worst-case adversarial disturbances in that context.