Search results for "Arbitrage"
showing 10 items of 330 documents
Champ d'application du principe d'ordre public de l'arrêt des poursuites individuelles en matière arbitrale
2004
International audience; (Com. 2 juin 2004, Sté Gaussin c/ Sté Alstom Power Turbomachines, pourvoi n° 02-13.940, arrêt n° 873 FS-P+I ; Com. 2 juin 2004, Sté Industry c/ Sté Alstom Power Turbomachines, pourvoi n° 02-18.700, arrêt n° 874 FS-P+I, D. 2004.1732, obs. A. Lienhard et 3184, obs. T. Clay)
Procédures collectives. Arbitrage, Créances antérieures au jugement d'ouverture, Débiteur mis en liquidation judiciaire, Suspension de la procédure a…
1998
International audience; (Paris, 8 sept. 1998, Me Ravise-Bés c/ SARL Le grand Carénage, inédit)
Les obligations du tribunal arbitral en cas d'ouverture d'une procédure collective : un arrêt « pédagogique » de la Cour de cassation
2009
International audience; (Civ. 1re, 6 mai 2009, pourvoi n° 08-10.281, arrêt n° 509 FS-P+B+I, Mandataires judiciaires associés c/ Sté International Company for Commercial Exchanges Income, D. 2009. AJ. 1422, obs. X. Delpech)
A rational expectations model for simulation and policy evaluation of the Spanish economy
2010
This paper presents the model used for simulation purposes within the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. REMS (a Rational Expectations Model for the Spanish economy) is a small open economy dynamic general equilibrium model in the vein of the New-Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis models, with a strongly micro-founded system of equations. In the long run REMS behaves in accordance with the neoclassical growth model. In the short run, it incorporates nominal, real and financial frictions. Real frictions include adjustment costs in consumption (via habits in consumption and rule-of-thumb households) and investment into physical capital. Due to financial frictions, there is no per…
Sentence arbitrale. Voie de recours, Appel, Délai, Point de départ, Signification de la sentence revêtue de l'exequatur, Article 1486, al. 2 NCPC
1995
International audience; (Civ. 2e, 15 févr. 1995, Soc. Sorco, inédit)
Errare persevare diabolicum est : une nouvelle affirmation de la prétendue nullité de la clause donnant au président du tribunal arbitral mandat pour…
2006
International audience; (CA Paris, 29 juin 2006, Caburol c/ Moyrand, inédit)
L'absence de saisine du juge d'appui pour suppléer à la carence des deux premiers arbitres pour désigner le troisième rend compte de la renonciation …
2019
International audience; (Civ. 1re, 19 déc. 2018, n° 17-17.874, FD, Soc. 20 Minutes France c/ M. Pierre Jean B., inédit)
Arbitrage institutionnel. Désignation d'un arbitre unique par l'institution, Volonté des parties de constituer un tribunal collégial, Interprétation,…
1994
International audience; (Civ. 1re, 10 févr. 1994, inédit, Mme Decrosse c/ Mme Bosquet et autres)
Asymmetric determinants of CDS spreads: U.S. industry-level evidence through the NARDL approach
2017
Abstract This paper investigates the presence of asymmetries in the short- and long-run relationships between the 5-year CDS index spreads at the U.S. industry level and a set of major macroeconomic and financial variables, namely the corresponding industry stock indices, the VIX index, the 5-year Treasury bond yield and the crude oil price, using the NARDL approach. The empirical results provide significant evidence of both short-run and long-run asymmetries in the linkage between ten industry CDS spreads and the potential driving factors common for all industries, confirming the importance of asymmetric nonlinearity in this context. It is also shown that the industry equity prices, the VI…
Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents
2019
Abstract For pools of essential patents I study whether a pool's sharing rule is stable against arbitrage, so that the pool's members have no incentive to trade patents. I show that the only stable rule is the numeric proportional rule, which gives each member a share of the pool's profit equal to its share of the pool's patents. I study how the stable rule affects firms' incentives to participate, and I show that firms with few patents tend to remain outside the pool. I look at the trade off between stability and participation, and I show that as trade dilutes their shares, members prefer the stable rule. I consider individual licenses, stand-alone patents, integration, and R&D. The result…