Search results for "C78"
showing 8 items of 8 documents
Linear and cyclic radio k-labelings of trees
2007
International audience; Motivated by problems in radio channel assignments, we consider radio k-labelings of graphs. For a connected graph G and an integer k ≥ 1, a linear radio k-labeling of G is an assignment f of nonnegative integers to the vertices of G such that |f(x)−f(y)| ≥ k+1−dG(x,y), for any two distinct vertices x and y, where dG(x,y) is the distance between x and y in G. A cyclic k-labeling of G is defined analogously by using the cyclic metric on the labels. In both cases, we are interested in minimizing the span of the labeling. The linear (cyclic, respectively) radio k-labeling number of G is the minimum span of a linear (cyclic, respectively) radio k-labeling of G. In this p…
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
Radio Labelings of Distance Graphs
2013
A radio $k$-labeling of a connected graph $G$ is an assignment $c$ of non negative integers to the vertices of $G$ such that $$|c(x) - c(y)| \geq k+1 - d(x,y),$$ for any two vertices $x$ and $y$, $x\ne y$, where $d(x,y)$ is the distance between $x$ and $y$ in $G$. In this paper, we study radio labelings of distance graphs, i.e., graphs with the set $\Z$ of integers as vertex set and in which two distinct vertices $i, j \in \Z$ are adjacent if and only if $|i - j| \in D$.
Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game
2009
Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equili…
Radio k-Labelings for Cartesian Products of Graphs
2005
International audience; Frequency planning consists in allocating frequencies to the transmitters of a cellular network so as to ensure that no pair of transmitters interfere. We study the problem of reducing interference by modeling this by a radio k-labeling problem on graphs: For a graph G and an integer k ≥ 1, a radio k-labeling of G is an assignment f of non negative integers to the vertices of G such that |f(x)−f(y)| ≥ k+1−dG(x,y), for any two vertices x and y, where dG(x,y) is the distance between x and y in G. The radio k-chromatic number is the minimum of max{f(x)−f(y):x,y ∈ V(G)} over all radio k-labelings f of G. In this paper we present the radio k-labeling for the Cartesian pro…
A Note on Radio Antipodal Colouring of Paths
2005
International audience; The radio antipodal number of a graph G is the smallest integer c such that there exists an assignment f : V (G) -> {1, 2, . . . , c} satisfying |f(u) − f(v)| >= D − d(u, v) for every two distinct vertices u and v of G, where D is the diameter of G. In this note we determine the exact value of the antipodal number of the path, thus answering the conjecture given in [G. Chartrand, D. Erwin, and P. Zhang. Radio antipodal colorings of graphs, Math. Bohem. 127(1):57-69, 2002]. We also show the connections between this colouring and radio labelings.
Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
2015
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction. Fil: Levine, David…
Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline
2002
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases t…